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Abstract  
Despite its rapid growth, there is little evidence on the 
population impact of social franchising in the health 
sector.  This paper evaluates a large-scale social franchising 
and telemedicine program in Bihar, India: the World Health 
Partners (WHP) Sky Program. Studying appropriate treatment for 
childhood diarrhea and pneumonia – and associated health 
outcomes, we analyze data collected from 67,950 children (ages 5 
and under) in 2011 and 2014 using multivariate difference-in-
difference models.  We find that the WHP-Sky program did not 
improve rates of appropriate treatment or disease prevalence. 
Both provider participation and service use among target 
populations were low. Our results do not imply that social 
franchising cannot succeed, but rather underscore the importance 
of understanding factors that explain variation in performance 
of social franchises. Our findings also highlight, for donors 
and governments in particular, the importance of conducting 
rigorous impact evaluations of new, potentially innovative 
healthcare delivery programs before investing in their scale-up.  
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Introduction 
The private sector delivers a large share of primary health 
services in many low income countries, particularly in rural 
areas where public sector providers are scarce [1-6]. In India, 
this share is about 70-80%  – and strikingly, the vast majority 
of private services are provided by unqualified informal sector 
providers [4, 7, 8]. Healthcare service quality in rural 
settings is often poor [5, 9, 10], and partly as a result, 
preventable childhood illnesses cause persistently high rates of 
mortality across India despite being inexpensive to treat [11]. 
Diarrhoeal diseases and respiratory infections alone accounted 
for nearly half a million deaths in children under five in 2013 
[12].   
 
Strategies to improve the quality of health services in low 
resource settings increasingly focus on new organizational 
models and technologies that are scalable and financially 
sustainable.  Within this landscape, social franchising models 
have become prominent. In 2014 alone, social franchising firms 
in developing countries provided healthcare services to almost 
28 million users for a range of conditions including family 
planning, reproductive health, and pediatric care [13]. 
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Social franchising adapts the tools of private sector commercial 
franchising to social sectors in which government also plays a 
role (such as  healthcare) [14, 15]. Although heterogeneous, 
social franchising programs include (1) a franchisor, which 
creates a brand and defines a bundle of services and delivery 
protocols, and (2) franchisees, who affiliate themselves with 
the brand but operate independently (within parameters 
established by the franchisor). Franchisees pay a subscription 
fee, and in return, the franchisor provides branded marketing, 
standardization of service delivery through explicit protocols, 
training, and supply chain management for drugs, diagnostics, 
and other products.  By affiliating existing providers into the 
franchise, a franchisor has the potential to quickly reach large 
populations with improved quality health services. New 
technologies are also often an integral part of efforts to 
improve health service delivery in low resource settings. These 
include telemedicine, which enable patients in remote areas to 
consult directly with highly trained clinicians in distant 
locations.  Similarly, mobile decision support technologies aid 
less trained health workers to deliver timely and appropriate 
care,raising service quality [16]. 
 
The theory of change embedded in social franchising includes a 
number necessary assumptions.  First, even if a new technology 
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(broadly defined to include devices, process improvements or 
organizational changes) can solve a problem faced by end users, 
it assumes there to be adequate demand for it. Second, it 
assumes that either the franchisee has a sufficiently large 
market share or that the adoption of this new technology will 
increase the use of franchisee health providers.  Third, it 
assumes that franchisee health providers will effectively use 
the technology in a way that actually improves service quality.  
Finally, it assumes that these improvements in quality will 
translate into improvements in population health.  
 
Despite rapid growth of social franchising programs and their 
use of new technologies, there is little rigorous evidence on 
their impact on population health at scale [17, 18] – or even on 
the individual assumptions embedded in the underlying theory of 
change (summarized above). Many existing studies focus on 
improvements in quality of care [19, 20] or increases in service 
use [21-24], but almost none have employed sufficiently rigorous 
methods to justify inclusion in Cochrane Reviews [14, 25, 26]. 
One recent exception is a social franchising and healthcare 
workforce expansion program in Myanmar that increased the 
treatment of diarrheal illness with oral rehydration solution 
containing zinc [27]. 
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In this paper, we evaluate the impact of World Health Partners 
(WHP) Sky program, a prominent social franchising program 
operating in 12 districts across the Indian state of Bihar (with 
population over 100 million), on appropriate treatment and 
prevalence of childhood diarrhea and pneumonia (primary outcomes 
established both by its major funder, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation (BMGF), and WHP itself). Launched in 2011 with over 
USD 23 million in funding from BMGF, the WHP-Sky Program has 
been recognized internationally and is currently being 
considered for scale-up both in India and other settings (Kenya, 
for example) [28-31]. BMGF also funded this independent 
evaluation of the program’s impact.  
 
Evolution of the WHP-Sky Program  
Original “Hub and Spoke” Model. In 2011, WHP launched a “hub and 
spoke” model of its Sky program, aiming to develop a network of 
20,000 healthcare providers previously working in the informal 
sector across 12 districts in Bihar. Specifically, WHP aimed to 
recruit informal sector providers into the network who would 
establish SkyHealth telemedicine facilities in villages with 
internet connectivity and recruit affiliated rural health 
providers from peripheral areas who would provide referrals to 
these telemedicine facilities for a fee. 
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SkyHealth providers would be trained to provide a range of 
primary care services including diagnostic consultations and 
drugs, and also allow patients to consult with highly trained 
physicians at WHP’s central medical facility (CMF) in New Delhi 
and Patna.  CMF providers are able to talk directly with 
patients through an internet-based audio/video interface, listen 
to chest auscultation, and remotely assess patients’ blood 
pressure, pulse, and electrocardiography.  WHP would also train 
peripheral rural health providers to provide basic primary care 
for common illnesses as well as to refer more complicated cases 
to SkyHealth “hubs.” The program also provided Sky-branded drugs 
through the WHP own supply chain, a network of labs, and 
conducted mass media campaigns to increase awareness about WHP-
Sky services. 
 
Current “Two Tier” Model. Over time, WHP shifted from this “hub 
and spoke” model to one with two tiers of independent 
franchisees [32].  The first tier consists of SkyHealth 
providers, who have facilities with telemedicine computer 
terminals (essentially, the “hubs” in the previous model).  The 
second tier consists of SkyCare providers (the “spokes” in the 
previous model), who are rural health providers with modest 
facilities or infrastructure and decision support capabilities 
from CMF physicians via mobile phones. In this two tier model, 
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Skycare providers comprise a large share of all WHP-Sky 
providers. Both types of providers charge patient fees for each 
visit, ranging from INR50 (approximately US$ 1) for a normal 
consultation to US$ 4 for consultation with a specialist (with 
subsidies for individuals classified to be below poverty line) 
[33, 34].  
 
Both tiers of providers received training on protocols for basic 
service delivery, marketing services, predictable supply of 
branded adequate quality drugs (SkyMeds), and access to 
diagnostics through SkyLab services. WHP also conducted 
marketing campaigns to advertise the availability of 
telemedicine providers in their area. 
 
Methods 
 
Data.  The Bihar Evaluation of Social Franchising and 
Telemedicine (BEST) Survey collected detailed data from randomly 
sampled households with children ages five and below in 360 
study clusters across 11 districts in which WHP planned to 
implement its Sky program (Exhibit 1). Baseline data collection 
was conducted in all 360 study clusters in 2011, prior to 
program implementation, and the follow-up was conducted in the 
same 360 study clusters in 2014 after the program had been 
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implemented in 153 of 360 study clusters. Study clusters were 
defined as the set of villages surrounding a central village 
meeting a priori eligibility criteria for a telemedicine center, 
primarily the availability of internet connectivity, 
infrastructure, and potential franchisees [35]. Before each 
wave, enumerators conducted a census of households in each study 
cluster, identifying all households with at least one child 
under five years of age. Within each cluster, among households 
meeting our inclusion criteria, we randomly selected 63 to 
survey, based on power calculations to achieve 90% power to 
detect 5% point improvement in key study outcomes even after 
accounting for multiple hypothesis testing. Response rates were 
high, with 94% of households responding in 2011 and 92% in 2014, 
yielding a final sample of 36,315 children living in 21,646 
households in 2011 and 31,635 children in 21,367 households in 
2014. 
 
Defined by BMGF in consultation with WHP, our primary study 
outcomes were appropriate treatment and prevalence of childhood 
diarrhoea and pneumonia (the most common illnesses in rural 
Bihar).  For all children under five, using answers to pre-
specified survey questions, we determined whether or not they 
had been ill with diarrhoea, coughing, fever or difficulty 
breathing in the preceding 15 days. If so, enumerators collected 
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detailed information, including symptoms, self-treatment, and 
whether care was sought from any source. If care was sought, the 
survey collected information about each visit to any type of 
healthcare provider, including provider type, treatments and 
medications prescribed, and costs associated with care.  
 
Prevalence of diarrhoea was defined as the presence of any loose 
or watery stool in the preceding 15 days.[36]  Because pneumonia 
is frequently undiagnosed, we relied on symptoms: the presence 
of fever, cough and difficulty breathing, with alternative 
methods of identifying potential pneumonia explored in Appendix 
1 in Web Appendix [37].  
[WEB APPENDIX LINK HERE] 
Appropriate treatment for diarrhoea include zinc therapy and 
zinc therapy in combination with Oral Rehydration Solution 
(ORS), both conditional on seeking care. For pneumonia, 
appropriate treatment is a 5-day course of antibiotics. 
 
We also examined secondary outcomes that the program may have 
plausibly influenced. For example, we examined changes in the 
likelihood that parents seek care for their children when sick 
and estimate changes in the overall share of sick children 
receiving appropriate treatment. Alternatively, parents may have 
learned about appropriate home management of childhood diarrhoea 
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and suspected pneumonia from health providers over time. Hence 
we also examined the likelihood that parents implemented 
appropriate treatment on their own.   
 
The survey also recorded socio-demographic information about 
household members, including household composition, age and 
education of each household member, caste, religion and assets.  
Appendix Exhibit A1.1 in Web Appendix provides household summary 
statistics [37].  The summary statistics at baseline show 
considerable room for improvement under the Sky Program. For 
example, among the 21.4% children who had diarrhea symptoms in 
the past two weeks at baseline, 69.4% sought care and only 1.4% 
of them received both zinc and ORS treatment. Similarly, 
although 84.5% of children with symptoms of pneumonia had 
received care at baseline, the share of those receiving 
appropriate treatment (5-day course of antibiotics) was 31.6%. 
 
Statistical Analysis. We estimate population-level effects of 
the Sky program using multivariate difference-in-difference 
models fit by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression [38-44].  
Specifically, we regress each primary outcome on an indicator 
denoting whether or not the study cluster had at least one 
active SkyHealth or SkyCare provider within the catchment area, 
interacted with an indicator of baseline or follow-up wave, 
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denoting either pre or post intervention as well as a set of 
covariates described below. In doing so, the difference-in-
difference method measures covariate-adjusted differences in the 
outcome variables between implementation and not implementation 
clusters in the post period, while netting out any pre-existing 
differences in the period before implementation started. To 
explore potential dose-response relationships between outcomes 
and intensity of program implementation, we also estimate models 
relating primary outcomes to Sky program intensity within each 
cluster (measured by the number of Sky providers within the 
catchment area). 
 
We control for a number of potentially confounding variables 
including the child’s age (indicators for 1-year age 
categories), the child’s sex, the age and literacy of the 
child’s mother, the number of other children in the household, 
household religion (indicator taking a value of 1 if the 
household is Hindu, and zero otherwise), household caste 
(indicator taking a value of 1 if the household is a member of a 
scheduled caste, scheduled tribe or other backward class), 
household Below Poverty Line (BPL) status, and wealth quintile 
(5 quantiles of wealth, estimated using principle components 
analysis of household assets).[45] To account for unobserved 
differences across districts in each survey wave, district-year 
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fixed effects are included in all models.  We calculate robust 
standard errors clustered at the study cluster level to take 
into account the dependence of observations within clusters.  
 
To assess the sensitivity of our results, we first examined the 
robustness of our findings to a range of alternative regression 
specifications (including tertiary outcomes that were not 
specified in our analysis plan; varying groups of control 
variables; and using alternative methods of identifying 
pneumonia cases). Second, because our primary analysis uses 
linear probability models for discrete outcomes (allowing for 
consistent fixed effects estimation while avoiding concerns 
about incidental parameters [46]), we repeated our analyses 
using non-linear probit models fit by maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE). Third, our analysis relies on classifying 
clusters into intervention and non-intervention areas based on 
verified location of Sky providers through our own provider 
census (through which our enumerators visited every provider in 
all study clusters both to verify their presence and to verify 
their affiliation with the WHP-Sky program). Because there were 
a number of instances in which this provider census found that 
providers’ locations differed from WHP program records, we also 
repeated our analysis using WHP records of Sky provider 
locations (rather than our own).  
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Finally, to assess the sensitivity of our difference in 
difference results to departures from asymptotic normality, we 
randomly drew an additional 1000 treatment and control 
assignments (using the same proportion of treatment and control 
clusters in both our census and in WHP rosters) and generated 
distributions of treatment effects from these 1000 random draws 
[47]. The results from all of these sensitivity analyses are 
reported in Appendix 2 of the Web Appendix [37].    
 
We note that the BEST evaluation was originally designed in 2011 
as a cluster randomized controlled trial[35]; however, WHP’s 
actual program implementation deviated substantially from the 
original implementation plan, necessitating the current 
observational study design (precluding the use of original 
random assignment to treatment/control status to instrument for 
actual status after implementation, for example).[48] Our 
revised quasi-experimental design and analysis plan (2013) is 
available online at http://www.cohesiveindia.org/publications-
downloads.html .  
 
Limitations. Our study has several limitations.  First, although 
the evaluation as originally designed as a randomized controlled 
trial (RCT), program implementation in practice deviated 
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substantially from the original implementation plan, rendering 
the RCT design untenable.  Our difference-in-difference 
observational study design relies on an assumption of parallel 
trends in primary outcomes between treatment and control areas 
absent the intervention.  However, as described in our 2013 pre-
analysis plan, we tested for the presence of pre-existing trend 
differences in primary outcomes prior to Sky Program 
implementation but do not find statistically significance 
evidence of any. See Appendix 3 in the Web Appendix for details 
[37]. Second, it was not feasible to conduct complete diagnostic 
evaluations of health outcomes in our large sample.  Instead we 
rely on survey based measures of two week recall of childhood 
health outcomes and healthcare utilization in order to minimize 
loss of recall, and also use video demonstration to improve 
specificity of measurement of pneumonia[49].  Third, there was 
disagreement between our field observations of WHP-Sky program 
locations and locations reported by WHP. Our finding of small 
and statistically insignificant program effects persist, 
regardless of whether we use our field observations or WHP 
reports of program implementation.  
 
Role of Funding Source. The funders had no role in study design 
(with the exception of identifying key outcomes), data 
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collection, analysis, interpretation, writing of the manuscript 
or decision to submit the paper for publication. 
 
Results 
 
WHP Market Share and Utilization. By early 2015, the WHP-Sky 
program claimed to include 8822 Skycare providers and 746 
Skyhealth providers in its network. However, at follow-up in 
2014, we found that WHP providers accounted for a very small 
share of providers in the study areas – only 3.5% of all 
providers (6% of private providers). The number of private 
providers per study cluster ranged between 8 and 70 (see Exhibit 
2), and the number of WHP providers per cluster ranged between 1 
and 6 (with a mean of 1.6 WHP and median of 1) – implying lower 
market share on average per WHP provider than non-WHP provider. 
Furthermore, as Mohanan et al. (2016) report, providers in the 
WHP network had fewer years of experience and lower patient 
volumes, accounting for an even smaller share of services 
delivered [50].  
 
Among all child visits to health providers in study clusters, 
only 2·9% of children with symptoms of diarrhoea and 3·1% of 
children with symptoms of pneumonia were taken to Sky providers 
(Exhibit 3). The vast majority of parents instead continued to 
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consult unaffiliated informal providers (40% of diarrhoea visits 
and 41% of pneumonia visits) or unaffiliated MBBS qualified 
private providers (31% of diarrhoea visits and 38% pneumonia 
visits).   
 
Appropriate Treatment. The Sky program had no overall 
significant effects on appropriate treatment of either childhood 
diarrhoea or pneumonia (Exhibits 4 and 5). Specifically, 
conditional on seeking care from a health provider, there was no 
statistically significant effect of implementation of the Sky 
program on the likelihood that a child sick with diarrhoea 
received either zinc therapy or zinc in combination with ORS 
therapy; estimated effect sizes and confidence intervals are -
1·4 percentage points [CI: -5·0-2·1] for probability of 
treatment of diarrhoea with zinc, -0·79 percentage points [CI:-
3·5-1·9] for treatment of diarrhoea with both zinc and ORS. 
Similarly, there was no statistically significant effect of 
program implementation on the likelihood that a child sick with 
pneumonia received a 5-day course of antibiotics (-1·7 
percentage points [CI: -8·9-5·6]). The maximum effect size 
supported by our estimates is a 2·1 percentage point increase 
for diarrhoea treatment with zinc therapy,  1·9 percentage point 
increase for treatment with zinc and ORS (relative to baseline 
levels of 2% and 1·9% respectively), and a 5·6 percentage point 
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increase for pneumonia treatment with 5-days of antibiotics 
(relative to baseline level of 11·5%).  
 
Examining program intensity using counts of WHP-Sky providers, 
there is also no evidence of a dose-response with appropriate 
treatment (shown as lower red bars in Exhibits 4 and 5) . Having 
an additional WHP-Sky provider in the implementation areas had 
no statistically significant effect on the probability that 
diarrhoea is treated with zinc [effect size: 0·3 percentage 
point change; CI:-1·3-0·7], or zinc in combination with ORS 
[effect size: 0·02 percentage point change; CI: -·09-0·13]. 
Likewise, there is no statistically significant dose-response 
relationship between the number of WHP-Sky providers and the 
probability of receiving a 5-day course of antibiotics [effect 
size: 0·07 percentage point change; CI: -3·3-3·1]. 
 
Even with a very low market share, if the quality of WHP 
services was better than other available services, dynamics in a 
competitive market could conceivably improve the quality of care 
in clusters with WHP providers. However, using data from 
vignette-based interviews and standardized patients, Mohanan et 
al. (2016) find no improvements in provider knowledge or quality 
of care in clusters with WHP providers relative to control areas 
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[50]. These results are consistent with the null effects that we 
find for appropriate treatment rates of diarrhea and pneumonia. 
 
We also consider program effects on secondary outcomes and do 
not find evidence of any program impact. As Exhibit 4 shows, 
parents were not more likely to seek care for childhood 
diarrhoea (effect size: 1·9 percentage point change [CI: -3·8-
7·7]) or pneumonia (effect size: -0·6 percentage point change 
[CI: -7·0-5·8] in Exhibut 5) under the program.  Similarly, 
parents were not more likely to treat their children with 
diarrhea at home using zinc therapy (effect size: 0·03 
percentage point change [CI: -0·3-0·2]) or using both zinc and 
ORS [effect size: 0·01 percentage point change; CI: -0·6-0·6]. 
Similarly, parents were not more likely to treat pneumonia at 
home correctly [effect size: 0·3 percentage point change; CI: -
0·9-1·6]. 
 
Prevalence of Childhood Pneumonia and Diarrhoea.  Consistent 
with our findings of no change in appropriate treatment for 
childhood diarrhoea and pneumonia, and no programmatic focus on 
coordinated preventive health measures, we also find no 
statistically significant effect of the Sky program on 
population health outcomes. Estimated program effects on the 
prevalence of diarrhoea (1·5 percentage point change [CI: -0·5-
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3·5]) and the prevalence of suspected pneumonia (0.1 percentage 
point change [CI: -0·8-1·0]) are precise and statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.  
 
Sensitivity Analyses. We performed a wide range of sensitivity 
analyses including a range of regression specifications 
(including tertiary outcomes and varying groups of control 
variables), as well as alternative approaches to identifying 
pneumonia cases (See Appendix 1 on Robustness in Web Appendix) 
[37]. We find that our results are robust across all of them.  
Further, to rule out that our findings of null effects are not 
driven by a non-normal asymptotic distribution of the estimated 
effects, we run 1000 iterations of our analyses using clusters 
randomly assigned to implementation and non-implementation in 
the same proportion as in our field data (results shown in 
Exhibit Figures 1-10 in Appendix 2) [37]. We find that our 
estimated treatment effects fall well within the distribution of 
treatment effects estimated under the null hypotheses of no 
program impact. For example, the 0·79 percentage point change in 
appropriate treatment of diarrhea using Zinc and ORS from our 
main analysis lies in the middle of the distribution of possible 
effects (Exhibit Figure 6 in Appendix 2) [37].  
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Discussion 
This paper presents one of the first evaluations of a large-
scale social franchising program to deliver healthcare services 
in a low resource setting. Despite considerable enthusiasm for 
social franchising (and the WHP program in particular) among 
some international organizations and policymakers, the World 
Health Partners (WHP) Sky Program did not improve rates of 
appropriate treatment for childhood diarrhoea and pneumonia - or 
related health outcomes - in the Indian state of Bihar. These 
illnesses continue to be an important priority in Bihar and 
other Indan states: consistent with our 2014 follow up data, the 
most recent National Family Health Survey (NFHS-4) suggests that 
10.7% of children report suffering from diarrhea in past two 
weeks  and 6.8% suffer from acute respiratory illnesses [51].   
 
The results of our evaluation should not be interpreted to imply 
that social franchising cannot improve health delivery or health 
outcomes in low income countries, however.  Together with the 
use of new technologies, social franchising is a potentially 
promising approach to improving the quality and reach of primary 
health services in low income countries, leveraging the 
widespread presence of private sector providers – many of whom 
are informal providers - in rural areas. Instead, understanding 
why the WHP-Sky program, which managed to attract early 
 21 
investments in excess of $23 million USD, failed to produce 
measurable impact is critical for the design of future social 
franchising programs and for global public health in general.  
 
Our study suggests several potential reasons why the WHP-Sky 
program failed to improve appropriate treatment of major 
childhood illnesses or to produce population health benefits. 
Improving these outcomes depended critically on WHP’s ability to 
reach a large share of its target populations – but market share 
in targeted study areas was only 3%.  Poor population coverage 
presumably reflects inter-related demand- and supply-side 
challenges.  On the demand side, the assumption that residents 
of rural Bihar would consider WHP-Sky services to be better 
quality than those otherwise available to them was not 
adequately tested prior to implementation and scale-up.  
Relatedly, the assumption that intended beneficiaries would be 
willing to pay as much – if not more – than they otherwise do 
for WHP-Sky services was also not adequately established before 
implementation. An empirically grounded view of what intended 
beneficiaries value in health care is required at the outset 
(and cannot be assumed to be based soley on technical clinical 
quality).[52]  
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On the supply side, WHP struggled to recruit informal sector 
providers into their network – and some of the providers who 
invested into joining the franchise network were relatively new 
entrants into healthcare delivery. This difficulty is likely 
related to a poor understanding of demand: local providers 
presumably have superior information about what their patients 
value in health care and may have recognized that WHP’s services 
would simply not be embraced as offered. In the end, the WHP 
network included only 6% of all private providers in study 
clusters.  
 
More generally, we summarize what we consider to be essential 
requirements for adequately understaning local conditions (or 
“local markets”) at the design stage – prior to implementation.  
The first is a careful understanding of what community members 
and patients value (and are willing to pay for).  The second is 
an understanding of what incentives these demand conditions 
create for local providers to join a social franchise network.  
Third, even if a new technology or delivery strategy can in 
principle solve a problem faced by end users, an understanding 
of how an innovation will translate into improved service 
quality in practice is essential.  Finally, an organization must 
understand how other market actors will respond to their 
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implementation or entry into a local market (in response to the 
availability of improved quality services, for example).   
 
We conclude with a brief observation about the difficult 
political economy of impact evaluation.  Despite growing 
emphasis on rigorous evaluation (which we believe is 
appropriate), the incentives for evaluation are complex and 
often mis-aligned.[53] An organization being evaluated may 
consider the threat of negative findings to outweigh the 
benefits of positive findings substantially –creating 
understandable antagonism.  (A related point is that evaluations 
should be conducted at the appropriate life-cycle stage of an 
organization – after it has had an opportunity to learn from 
initial experience and refine its approach through small scale 
activity.)  A funder may in turn require an evaluation as a 
condition of financial support – but funders themselves then 
often have a stake in the findings.  These difficulties need to 
be understood and addressed more thoroughly. Although funders 
and organizations delivering health services should not be 
afraid to fail, learn, and improve, existing incentives are 
often inconsistent with this approach. 
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List of Exhibits: 
EXHIBIT 1 (Figure) 
Caption: Study cluster locations 
Source: Author’s data from Bihar Evaluation of Social 
Franchising and Telemedicine (BEST) study 
Notes:  
 
EXHIBIT 2 (Figure) 
Caption: Range of number of private providers in each study 
cluster 
Source: Provider Listing data collected by authors as part of 
Bihar Evaluation of Social Franchising and Telemedicine 
(BEST) study 
Notes:  
 
EXHIBIT 3 (Figure) 
Caption: Provider use in program implementation areas, by type 
of provider 
Source: Authors’ analysis of household survey data collected for 
Bihar Evaluation of Social Franchising and Telemedicine 
(BEST) study 
Notes: Figure shows the proportion of patient visits made to 
each type of provider. Proportions are unadjusted and self-
reported by survey respondents 
 
EXHIBIT 4 (Figure) 
Caption: Program Effects on Appropriate Treatment, Service Use, 
and Disease Prevalence of Childhood Diarrhea  
Source: Authors’ analysis of household survey data collected for 
Bihar Evaluation of Social Franchising and Telemedicine 
(BEST) study 
Notes: For each outcome, point estimates and confidence 
intervals shown correspond to program effect sizes estimated 
using multivariate difference-in-difference models fit using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. The outcome is 
regressed on a program implementation  variable (either an 
indicator denoting whether or not the study cluster had at 
least one active SkyHealth or SkyCare provider within the 
catchment area, or the count of Sky providers within the 
catchment area) interacted with a dummy variable indicating 
pre or post intervention. District-year fixed effects and 
controls for the age of the child (indicators for 1 year age 
categories), the sex of the child, the age and literacy of 
the child’s mother, the number of other children in the 
household, household religion (indicator taking a value of 1 
if the household is Hindu, and zero otherwise), household 
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caste (indicator taking a value of 1 if the household is a 
member of a scheduled caste, scheduled tribe or other 
backward class), household BPL status, and wealth quintile 
are included by not shown. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the study cluster level. 
 
EXHIBIT 5 (Figure) 
Caption: Program Effects on Appropriate Treatment, Service Use, 
and Disease Prevalence of Childhood Diarrhea  
Source: Authors’ analysis of household survey data collected for 
Bihar Evaluation of Social Franchising and Telemedicine 
(BEST) study 
Notes: For each outcome, point estimates and confidence 
intervals shown correspond to program effect sizes estimated 
using multivariate difference-in-difference models fit using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. The outcome is 
regressed on a program implementation  variable (either an 
indicator denoting whether or not the study cluster had at 
least one active SkyHealth or SkyCare provider within the 
catchment area, or the count of Sky providers within the 
catchment area) interacted with a dummy variable indicating 
pre or post intervention. District-year fixed effects and 
controls for the age of the child (indicators for 1 year age 
categories), the sex of the child, the age and literacy of 
the child’s mother, the number of other children in the 
household, household religion (indicator taking a value of 1 
if the household is Hindu, and zero otherwise), household 
caste (indicator taking a value of 1 if the household is a 
member of a scheduled caste, scheduled tribe or other 
backward class), household BPL status, and wealth quintile 
are included by not shown. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the study cluster level. 
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summary statistics 
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DD Analysis 
 
 
 
